Young Democracies and Government Size: Evidence from Latin America by Manoel Bittencourt
 
 
University of Pretoria 
Department of Economics Working Paper Series 
 
 
Young Democracies and Government Size: Evidence from Latin America  
Manoel Bittencourt 
University of Pretoria 
























Department of Economics 
University of Pretoria 
0002, Pretoria 
South Africa 
Tel: +27 12 420 2413 
 





We empirically investigate the hypothesis that when democracies are young, or
still fragile and unconsolidated, the size of government (in terms of consumption, debt
and share to GDP) tends to increase in an attempt to buy out the electorate, so that
democracy becomes acceptable and ￿ the only game in town￿ . Our sample includes nine
Latin American countries between 1970 and 2007 and the results, based on principal
component and panel data analyses (POLS, Fixed E⁄ects and SYS-GMM estimators),
suggest that the young democracies of Latin America have been indeed associated with
bigger governments. Furthermore, we test for the hypothesis that the old dictatorships
also engaged in activities which would leave the young democracies with bigger de￿cits
to be repaid, therefore with bigger governments in their initial stages. This hypothesis
is not con￿rmed by the analysis conducted here. Finally, there is some evidence that as
democracies, and also the electorate, mature over time, the size of government shows
signs of reduction.
Keywords: Democracy, government, Latin America.
JEL Classi￿cation: H11, N16, O11, O54.I. Introduction and Motivation
Latin America, at least in its recent history, has been known for political transitions
from dictatorships to more democratic regimes, macroeconomic instability (in terms of high
rates of in￿ ation), delayed stabilisation processes in a Alesina and Drazen (1991) sense (in
some cases macroeconomic stabilisation took roughly ten years to be achieved), and no come
back to less democratic regimes (democracy seems to be maturing in the continent). The
region has also been known for a certain, rather above the average, degree of persistent
economic inequality1.
Against this background, we test the hypothesis that governments in young democracies
tend to consume more, generate higher debt and consequently increase their shares to GDP
(or overall size) when there is this transition to more democratic regimes. This might be
because new regimes face many challenges; sometimes crumbling infrastructure, low wages,
or even the need to renovate the entire bureaucracy. In addition, the reason for this increase
in size might be the high economic inequality prevalent in some countries in the region and
the need for some sort of redistribution (Meltzer and Richard (1991)). Or it can also be that
democracy in its infancy faces severe opposition, and therefore these new regimes try to buy
out the electorate so that democracy becomes ideologically acceptable and literally ￿ the only
game in town￿ .
In addition, we investigate whether the last dictatorship in power engaged in activities
which would leave those new democratic regimes with considerable debt to be repaid. That
would explain the need for higher borrowing, and therefore higher debt when democracies are
still young (Alesina and Tabellini (1990)). Finally, we check the hypothesis that democracies,
even very young ones, mature over time, or that the electorate learn the nuts and bolts of the
democratic game so that governments start being more responsible, and perhaps e¢ cient,
at least in terms of spending and debt generation.
To conduct the analysis we use data from nine Latin American countries which rede-
mocratised at some point in the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s, and given data availability, we cover
1the period between 1970 and 2007. For the empirical analysis we make use of static and
dynamic panel data models. More speci￿cally, we use the Pooled Ordinary Least Squared,
Fixed E⁄ects and SYSTEM Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In terms of results, ￿rstly we ￿nd that governments indeed increased in size during the
￿rst two democratic terms and, in fact, during the whole democratic period. Secondly, we
do not ￿nd any evidence that the outgoing dictatorships of the day engaged in some sort of
bigger government activities and left the new democratic coalitions with signi￿cant debt to
be repaid. Hence, the particular excuse for the need for higher government borrowing and
debt in young democracies can be avoided. Thirdly, we are able to provide some evidence
that democracies indeed mature over time, or that government size starts coming down as
time after democratisation passes by.
The subject of electoral budget cycles has attracted attention for some time and the
literature is clearly evolving over time in terms of explanations provided for the very ex-
istence of bigger governments. For instance, Rogo⁄ and Sibert (1988), and Rogo⁄ (1990)
theoretically suggest that information is asymmetric, at least in the short run, and that
governments doing a rather good job will actually try to signal to the electorate, via higher
spending or lower taxes, their achievements. Following that lead, Gonzalez (2002) studies
the case of Mexico, a sort of mature democracy, at least in Latin American terms, and ￿nds
out that even under a one-party democracy, which is the Mexican case, the government
increases spending during more democratic periods within an already democratic regime.
This is probably to avoid opposition within the governing coalition or even to signal good
deeds.
Woo (2003) formally introduces the role of inequality in the analysis, which some would
argue to be an important factor in Latin America. He makes use of panel data and ￿nds
that inequality, and also ￿nance, are related to bigger public de￿cits (probably via some sort
of redistribution and easy access to ￿nance). Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) investigate
the case of a young democracy, Russia, to ￿nd out that ￿scal cycles diminish with time, or
2as they put it, with a freer and better media, a less-myopic electorate, and better checks and
balances governments become less frivolous in their spending activities. All in all, with time
there is a learning process of the nuts and bolts of democracy. Brender and Drazen (2005)
extend on this and suggest that in a large cross-section of countries ￿scal cycles are driven
by young democracies, since voters tend to be ￿scal conservatives in more mature societies
(OECD countries).
Woo (2005 and 2008) extends on his previous analysis and suggests that polarisation
within the coalition in power might generate a ￿ght for the common resources pool, which
leads to higher de￿cits and consequently output collapse. Shi and Svensson (2006) also
makes use of panel data and suggests that in election years the de￿cit increases, particularly
in developing countries in which corruption tends to be more prevalent. Brender and Drazen
(2007) extend on the idea of young democracies being vulnerable and not entirely supported
by the electorate, and indicate that higher spending during the ￿rst years of democratisation
is a temporary solution to buy out the electorate so that democracy becomes ￿ the only game
in town￿ .
Finally, Alesina, Tabellini and Campante (2008), also using panel data, suggest that
￿scal pro-cyclicality in developing countries takes place because the electorate attempts to
￿ starve the Leviathan￿ , or to make sure to extract, during booms, from the government all
resources possible, before the coalition in power wastes those resources in more frivolous
activities.
In essence, the literature clearly suggests that governments, not only in developing
countries as well suggested by Rogo⁄ (1990), tend to increase in size either before elec-
tions (for all sorts of reasons), or because, particularly in developing countries with young
democracies, the new regime faces all sorts of challenges (inequality, corruption, ideological
unacceptance), so the need to buy out the electorate. Furthermore, the literature suggests
that young democracies do not stay ￿ forever young￿ , they mature, and with maturity gov-
ernments tend to become either more e¢ cient with their spending, or more conservative and
3responsible in what they spend.
Given the above, the value added of this paper to the literature is that we make use of
a sample of Latin American countries (all sharing some developing countries characteristics,
but with their own idiosyncrasies), which democratised at some point in the last forty years
or so. This is interesting in itself because with that sample we can disaggregate and further
our knowledge on how governments in young democracies behave over the short and long
run, and not only during electoral years, in terms of consumption, debt generation and
overall government size. Furthermore, we construct a variable for government size based on
principal component analysis that is believed to be more robust, and make use of a range of
panel data estimators to make sure that our results are robust. It is therefore believed that
we are able to speci￿cally understand the recent history of Latin America, instead of treating
the region either as an outlier to be removed from the sample, or as a dummy variable.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: the next sections describe the data set, the
empirical methodology used, and then it presents and discusses the main results obtained.
We then conclude and o⁄er some future research avenues that can be pursued from here.
II. Empirical Analysis
A. A Look at the Data
The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and nine Latin American coun-
tries which transitioned from political dictatorship to full democracy at some point in the
late 1970s (Ecuador), 1980s (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay), and early
1990s (Guyana and Paraguay).
The variables used to measure the size of government are the share of government
to GDP (from the Penn World Table), government consumption (from the International
Financial Statistics provided by the IMF), and the share of public debt to GDP (from the
Historical Public Debt Database, also provided by the IMF). With that sort of information
we can then make use of principal component analysis and extract from the standardised data
4matrix the unobserved common factors of these three, and rather popular in the literature,
variables for government. We therefore end up with a proxy for government size (GOV ) which
contributes to reduce model uncertainty and that is believed to present more explanatory
power. In this particular case, the ￿rst principal component￿ which roughly corresponds to
the mean of the series￿ accounts for 52% of the variation in these three variables.
We then construct di⁄erent sets of dummy variables to account for the role of democrati-
sation on government size. The ￿rst one (NDEMOC), accounts for the ￿st two democratic
terms (in which a positive and signi￿cant estimate indicates that the young democracies
presented bigger governments); the second one (DEMOC) accounts for the whole demo-
cratic period (a positive estimate suggests that the size of government increases under more
democratic regimes); the third one is for the last term of dictatorship (LDICTAT), in which
a negative and signi￿cant estimate indicates that the last dictator did not engage in gen-
erating a bigger government, which would leave the new regime with signi￿cant levels of
debt to be repaid in its initial stages; and ￿nally a dummy which counts the number of
years after democratisation (MDEMOC). In this case, a negative and signi￿cant estimate
indicates that the size of government decreases with time, or alternatively that democracy,
or the electorate, mature over time, or to put it another way, that governments become more
responsible with a more mature electorate.
The control variables used are relatively standard in the literature and they are as
follows: a measure for trade openness relative to GDP (OPEN), which is provided by
the Penn World Table, and it is expected that more open economies tend to display lower
debt, or smaller governments. Moreover, we use the share of the liquid liabilities to GDP
(M2), which come from the World Development Indicators and are provided by the World
Bank, and GDP and GDP growth (GDP and GROWTH), which also come from the Penn
World Table. In those cases, it is expected that in economies with better developed ￿nancial
sectors governments can acquire ￿nance more easily, and economies growing relatively fast
can display, via the automatic stabilisers, lower debt. The in￿ ation rates (INFLAT), come
5from the World Development Indicators, and it is expected that higher in￿ ation, via higher
nominal interest rates, leads to higher, or even ballooning, debt, or bigger governments.
In addition, constraints on the executive (XCONST) come from the Polity IV data
set, the urbanisation (URBAN) series are from the World Development Indicators, and the
Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality (INEQ) from the UNU-WIDER data base. What is
expected from these more structural control variables is that more constrained executives
tend to be more restrained in what they consume and consequently run lower debt, rapid
urbanisation in developing countries leads to more spending in infrastructure, and higher
inequality leads to some sort of redistribution (either via taxation or provision of particular
public goods).
To brie￿ y illustrate the behaviour of the government share to GDP (gshare) and govern-
ment debt to GDP (gdebt), in Figure One below we plot both series against time. This initial
eyeball evidence suggests that these country averages increased considerably during the late
1970s and early 1980s, which roughly coincides with the implementation of more democratic
regimes in the region. On the other hand, both series present a reasonably consistent reduc-
tion from the 1990s onwards, which might suggest that some time after democratisation the
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Figure 1: Government Share to GDP (gshare) and Government Debt to GDP (gdebt), Latin America,
1970-2007. Source: Penn World Table and IMF.
Moreover, we provide the correlation matrix in Table One, and the statistical correlation
between our proxy for government (GOV ) and the dummy for the ￿rst two democratic terms
(NDEMOC) is positive and signi￿cant at 5% level. The correlation between GOV and the
dummy for the whole democratic period (DEMOC) is positive, however not statistically
signi￿cant, as well as the correlation between GOV and the dummy for the last term of those
dictatorships (LDICTAT). Finally, the correlation between GOV and the dummy which
counts the number of years after democratisation (MDEMOC) is negative and statistically
signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Also of interest, the correlations among the government share to GDP (gshare), gov-
ernment consumption (gcon) and government debt (gdebt)￿ the variables used to construct
the proxy GOV ￿ with NDEMOC are all positive and mostly signi￿cant. On the other
hand, the correlations among the government share to GDP, and government consumption
and debt with MDEMOC are all negative and signi￿cant. These preliminary correlations
suggest that the size of government increases during the ￿rst years of democratisation and
7then decreases in the long term, or alternatively that democracy￿ or the electorate￿ mature
over time.
Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Latin America, 1970-2007.
GOV GSHARE GCON GDEBT NDEMOC DEMOC LDICTAT MDEMOC
GOV 1
GSHARE 0.867* 1
GCON 0.810* 0.500* 1
GDEBT 0.385* -.001 0.048 1
NDEMOC 0.322* 0.162* 0.275* 0.090 1
DEMOC 0.011 -0.110* 0.104 -0.055 0.426* 1
LDICTAT 0.009 0.172* -0.061 0.095 -0.163* -0.417* 1
MDEMOC -0.336* -0.300* -0.162* -0.134* -0.186* 0.725* -0.315* 1
Sources: Penn World Table, IMF, and Polity IV ￿les. * represents signi￿cance at the 5% level.
In addition, we provide the OLS regression lines between government debt to GDP
and the dummies for the ￿rst two democratic terms, the whole democratic period and the
number of years after democratisation. What can be seen from this visual evidence is that
there is a rather clear positive relationship between debt and young democracies, a positive,
however weaker, relationship between debt and democracy, and ￿nally a not entirely positive











































Figure 2: OLS Regression Lines, Government Debt to GDP (gdebt) and Democracy, Latin America,
1970-2007. Sources: IMF and Polity IV.
In essence, the above preliminary evidence, with all its caveats, suggests that in one
way or another the sizes of those governments, or consumption and consequently debt,
increased during the ￿rst two democratic terms. Moreover, the evidence weakly suggests
that democracy matures over time, or put it another way, that the size of overall government,
or consumption and debt, have decreased as time after democratisation has gone by.
B. Empirical Strategy
In terms of empirical strategy, since we have a panel of nine Latin American countries
(N = 9) covering the period between 1970 and 2007 (T = 38), we follow the previous
literature and make use of static and dynamic panel data analysis.
Initially we make use of the baseline Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), and of the
Fixed E⁄ects (FE) estimators for our static speci￿cations. The POLS assumes homogeneity
of intercepts and slopes, and it gives equal weight to the within (yit￿￿ yi) and between (￿ yi￿￿ y)
variances in the data. The FE estimator (with robust standard errors for the correlation of
residuals over time) assumes heterogeneity of intercepts, a reasonable assumption in such
a diverse panel of countries, and it makes use only of the within (￿ yi ￿ ￿ y) variation in the
data. Moreover, under the assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors, the POLS and
FE estimators provide unbiased estimates of the expected values of the coe¢ cients in static
models.
9Secondly, in our dynamic speci￿cations we ￿rst use the FE estimator, with robust stan-
dard errors, which under T ! 1, not only minimises the Nickell bias present in short T
dynamic panels, but also gives consistent estimates of the expected values. Furthermore,
although we attempt to use￿ given data availability￿ the most common control variables in
the literature, one would argue that omitted variables, measurement error, and even some
sort of (statistical or economic) endogeneity might be present. Thus, controlling for the
number of instruments￿ and for what we instrument￿ to avoid over￿tting (Bond (2002) and
Roodman (2009)), we carefully make use of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)
that also takes into account the fact that persistent series might lead to weak instruments
(and to a non-negligible small sample bias). We therefore make use of the GMM estimator,
with robust standard errors and the small-sample correction provided by Windmeijer (2005)
to avoid ￿ too good to be true￿standard errors, that combines the usual moment conditions
for the ￿rst-di⁄erence GMM model (yit￿2;:::;yi1), with those extra conditions for the model
in levels (￿yit￿1), SYSTEM (SYS), or the SYS-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998).
All in all, the above-mentioned static and dynamic estimators take into account not only
the fact that those countries in the sample share particular characteristics (all of them went
through political transitions), but also the fact that such a panel is, no doubt, heterogenous
(some of the countries in the sample are more developed than others, more or less unequal
than others, or have been under democratic regimes for longer than others). Moreover,
some of these estimators take into consideration the possibility of omitted variables and
measurement error biases, and endogeneity issues, which is always an advantage for an
estimator. The estimated di⁄erenced SYS-GMM dynamic equation is as follows,
￿GOVit = ￿￿NDEMOCit + ￿￿OPENit + ￿￿M2it￿1 + ￿￿GDPit￿1
+￿￿GROWTHit + "￿INFLATit￿1 + ￿￿XCONSTit
+￿￿URBANit + ￿￿INEQit + #￿GOVit￿1 + ￿￿it;
10where GOV is the proxy for government size which comprises the unobserved common
factors among government share to GDP, government consumption and government debt,
NDEMOC is the ￿rst set of dummies which accounts for the ￿rst two democratic terms,
OPEN is a measure for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities over GDP, GDP
is the real GDP and GROWTH are the GDP growth rates, INFLAT are the in￿ ation
rates, XCONST accounts for constraints on the executive, URBAN is the share of urban
population, and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality.
C. Results and Discussion
In Table Two below we report the static and dynamic estimates of the dummy covering
the ￿rst two democratic terms. More speci￿cally, in columns (1) and (2) the static POLS
and FE estimates of NDEMOC on GOV are positive and statistically signi￿cant. These
estimates suggest that during the ￿rst two democratic terms GOV indeed increased in size.
The cyclical and structural control variables present roughly the expected signs against GOV ;
OPEN is positive, although not entirely signi￿cant, M2 is positive, which indicates that
deeper ￿nancial sectors ease the burden of ￿nance on governments, GDP and GROWTH
present the expected negative estimates (economies growing faster present lower debt, via
the automatic stabilisers), and INFLAT, presumably via higher nominal interest rates,
presents positive estimates, although not signi￿cant.
About the structural controls, XCONST presents negative estimates (more constrained
executives have less room to engage in larger spending), URBAN presents positive estimates,
although not signi￿cant, and ￿nally INEQ is the control presenting somehow non-expected
negative estimates (one would expect that high inequality, prevalent in some Latin American
countries, leads to higher spending and transfers, or redistribution of some kind).
Moving to our preferred dynamic speci￿cations, in columns (3) and (4) we present the FE
and SYS-GMM estimates of NDEMOC against GOV . Both estimators deliver the same,
and statistically signi￿cant, story of bigger governments during the ￿rst two democratic
11terms. The controls are also consistent with the static estimates (￿nancial depth facilitates
bigger governments), fast growing economies are able to reduce debt, more constrained
executives tend to spend less, and higher inequality is not really leading to higher spending,
as one would expect in Latin America. Finally, the Arellano and Bond m2 test for second-
order serial correlation suggest that we can not reject the null hypothesis and the Sargan
test does not indicate that the instrument set is invalid.
12Table Two: POLS, FE and SYS-GMM Estimates
Static and Dynamic Models
GOV POLS FE FE SYS-GMM
NDEMOC .472 (3.31) .230 (1.78) .141 (4.12) .141 (3.94)
OPEN .000 (.28) .007 (4.49) .000 (0.30) .000 (0.29)
M2 .473 (2.87) .201 (0.95) .302 (3.19) .302 (3.05)
GDP -.000 (-1.28) -.000 (-2381) -.000 (-2.92) -.000 (-2.80)
GROWTH -.032 (-2.76) -.030 (-7.71) -.030 (-8.19) -.030 (-7.84)
INFLAT .125 (1.49) .061 (0.91) .024 (0.62) .024 (0.59)
XCONST -.113 (-3.96) -.030 (-0.68) -.027 (-2.36) -.027 (-2.26)
URBAN .000 (.03) .025 (0.98) .005 (1.12) .005 (1.08)
INEQ -.006 (-.73) -.032 (-1.75) -.006 (-2.80) -.006 (-2.68)




T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. GOV is the proxy for government size,
NDEMOC is the set of dummies which accounts for the ￿rst two democratic terms, OPEN is a measure
for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities over GDP, GDP is the real GDP and GROWTH are
the GDP growth rates, INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, XCONST accounts for constraints on the
executive, URBAN is the share of urban population, and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income
inequality. POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects and SYS-GMM is the
System Generalised Method of Moments.
In Table Three we report the estimates of the dummy covering the whole democratic
period, DEMOC, against GOV . In columns (1) and (2) the static estimates of DEMOC
are not entirely clear cut (the POLS presents negative, although not signi￿cant, and the FE
presents positive, and just marginally signi￿cant, estimates). The control variables present
13consistent estimates with the ones reported above (more open and ￿nancially developed
economies can engage in higher consumption and debt, although those estimates are not
entirely signi￿cant, fast growing economies have the ability to reduce debt, and higher in-
equality is not behind bigger governments in Latin America).
On the other hand, in columns (3) and (4) the preferred dynamic FE and SYS-GMM
estimates clearly suggest that governments indeed increased in size during the whole de-
mocratic period. The controls follow similar patterns as before, with ￿nancial depth being
positively related to GOV , fast growing economies displaying lower debt, constraints on the
executive restraining spending, and inequality once again not displaying any e⁄ect on larger
governments. The Arellano and Bond, and Sargan tests do not suggest that the instrument
set is in anyway invalid.
14Table Three: POLS, FE and SYS-GMM Estimates
Static and Dynamic Models
GOV POLS FE FE SYS-GMM
DEMOC -.343 (-1.37) .471 (1.63) .243 (3.94) .243 (3.77)
OPEN .002 (0.88) .007 (6.26) .000 (0.59) .000 (0.57)
M2 .495 (2.86) .267 (1.35) .340 (3.54) .340 (3.39)
GDP -.000 (-1.04) -.000 (-16.99) -.000 (-3.97) -.000 (-3.80)
GROWTH -.024 (-2.02) -.031 (-6.46) -.031 (-8.72) -.031 (-8.35)
INFLAT .219 (2.68) .068 (1.09) .029 (0.76) .029 (0.72)
XCONST -.037 (-0.72) -.050 (-1.56) -.034 (-3.91) -.034 (-3.74)
URBAN -.001 (-0.17) -.009 (-0.28) -.014 (-2.11) -.014 (-2.02)
INEQ -.007 (-0.83) -.033 (-1.86) -.007 (-2.38) -.007 (-2.28)




T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. GOV is the proxy for government size,
DEMOC is the set of dummies which accounts for the whole democratic regime, OPEN is a measure
for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities over GDP, GDP is the real GDP and GROWTH are
the GDP growth rates, INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, XCONST accounts for constraints on the
executive, URBAN is the share of urban population, and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income
inequality. POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects and SYS-GMM is the
System Generalised Method of Moments.
In Table Four we run a simple exercise for the fact that perhaps the outgoing dictator-
ships engaged in activities that would leave the young democracies of Latin America with
signi￿cant debt to be repaid, therefore the need for higher borrowing in the initial stages
of democracy. In columns (1) and (2) the static estimates of LDICTAT against GOV do
15not present any clear cut picture. The control variables present similar patterns as before,
￿nancial depth facilitates bigger governments, fast growing economies are able to reduce the
debt, more constrained executives are not able to spend freely, and inequality, once more
going against the conventional wisdom, presents negative estimates on GOV .
On the other hand, our preferred FE and SYS-GMM dynamic speci￿cations clearly
suggest that at least the last dictator in power did not engage in higher consumption nor
debt, therefore not leaving the young democracies of the day with huge bills to be repaid, so
the usual excuse for bigger governments, or borrowing, during the ￿rst years of democracy
can be somehow avoided. About the controls, the liquid liabilities keep their importance in
￿nancing higher debt, as well as economic growth in reducing debt, and inequality still does
not play any role in terms of bigger governments. Once again, the speci￿cation tests do not
detect any sign of second-order serial correlation or overidenti￿cation.
16Table Four: POLS, FE and SYS-GMM Estimates
Static and Dynamic Models
GOV POLS FE FE SYS-GMM
LDICTAT .111 (0.57) -.182 (-1.40) -.142 (-4.49) -.142 (-4.30)
OPEN .002 (0.90) .008 (8.17) .001 (0.95) .001 (0.91)
M2 .520 (3.00) .253 (1.21) .335 (3.39) .335 (3.25)
GDP -.000 (-1.05) -.000 (-16.61) -.000 (-4.06) -.000 (-3.89)
GROWTH -.024 (-2.04) -.030 (-5.20) -.029 (-7.94) -.029 (-7.60)
INFLAT .227 (2.76) .076 (1.18) .031 (0.73) .031 (0.70)
XCONST -.087 (-2.65) .001 (0.02) -.013 (-0.86) -.013 (-0.82)
URBAN -.001 (-0.18) .001 (0.04) -.010 (-2.28) -.010 (-2.18)
INEQ -.008 (-0.92) -.034 (-1.81) -.007 (-2.53) -.007 (-2.42)




T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. GOV is the proxy for government size,
LDICTAT is the set of dummies which counts the years after redemocratisation, OPEN is a measure
for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities over GDP, GDP is the real GDP and GROWTH are
the GDP growth rates, INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, XCONST accounts for constraints on the
executive, URBAN is the share of urban population, and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income
inequality. POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects and SYS-GMM is the
System Generalised Method of Moments.
Finally, in Table Five we report the estimates of our dummy that counts the number of
years after democratisation (MDEMOC), and the static POLS and FE estimates are not
particularly clear cut. The control variables presenting signi￿cant estimates are openness
and ￿nancial depth (positive), growth (negative) and inequality (negative), which somehow
17con￿rms the previous estimates reported above.
In contrast, our preferred dynamic FE and SYS-GMM estimates signi￿cantly suggest
that democracy matures over time, or alternatively that as time goes by, the size of govern-
ments actually decreases in Latin America. On the controls, ￿nance is again an important
source of debt, higher growth works via the automatic stabilisers in reducing debt, and in-
equality (against all odds) presents negative and signi￿cant e⁄ects on GOV . About the
validity of the instrument set, the Arellano and Bond, and Sargan tests again do not detect
any evidence of invalidity or proliferation of instruments.
18Table Five: POLS, FE and SYS-GMM Estimates
Static and Dynamic Models
GOV POLS FE FE SYS-GMM
MDEMOC -.035 (-4.20) .018 (1.10) -.009 (-2.07) -.009 (-1.98)
OPEN .000 (0.20) .008 (6.60) .000 (0.61) .000 (0.58)
M2 .468 (2.92) .229 (1.15) .325 (2.87) .325 (2.75)
GDP -.000 (-1.48) -.000 (-10.41) -.000 (-2.49) -.000 (-2.39)
GROWTH -.030 (-2.70) -.030 (-5.58) -.030 (-6.76) -.030 (-6.47)
INFLAT .109 (1.35) .084 (1.27) .027 (0.58) .027 (0.56)
XCONST -.016 (-0.49) .014 (0.24) -.006 (-0.46) -.006 (-0.44)
URBAN .000 (0.07) -.019 (-0.52) .006 (0.86) .006 (0.82)
INEQ -.004 (-0.48) -.035 (-1.84) -.005 (-2.08) -.005 (-1.99)




T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. GOV is the proxy for government size,
MDEMOC is the set of dummies which counts the years after redemocratisation, OPEN is a measure
for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities over GDP, GDP is the real GDP and GROWTH are
the GDP growth rates, INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, XCONST accounts for constraints on the
executive, URBAN is the share of urban population, and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income
inequality. POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects and SYS-GMM is the
System Generalised Method of Moments.
All in all, we present evidence which suggests that young democracies do indeed indulge
themselves in higher consumption, debt and consequently higher government share in the
GDP. This might be because of the many challenges that young democracies face from the
outset (demand for some sort of redistribution, ￿erce opposition to democracy by particu-
19lar groups in its early stages and consequently the need to buy out the electorate so that
democracy becomes ￿ the only game in town￿ )3.
On the other hand, we present some evidence that suggests that those young democra-
cies of Latin America cannot put blame on the last dictator of the day for the higher debt
incurred in the early stages of democracies to repay the bills elusively left by the last dicta-
torship. Finally, there is also some evidence indicating that democracy, and the electorate,
mature over time (better media, better dissemination and acquisition of information, or more
experience in dealing with the democratic process), so that those governments engage less
in spending and higher debt.
In terms of the control variables used, access to ￿nance M2 plays an important role
in providing governments with ￿nancial resources which are probably used to reissue and
generate new government consumption and debt, and the automatic stabilisers seem to be
at work via faster economic growth. In addition, one important cyclical control variable
that is rarely signi￿cant in the analysis is in￿ ation. This is probably because some of those
countries engaged in interest rate controls (￿nancial repression), which would arti￿cially
reduce the impact of higher nominal interest rates on debt, while others had completely
indexed economies during their episodes of hyperin￿ ation. It seems that overall both e⁄ects
are cancelling each other out.
Finally, an old determinant of redistribution, or bigger governments, inequality, does
not play, as suggested by Woo (2003, 2005 and 2008), its expected role in the region. This
is perhaps because, although Latin America is known for being rather unequal, in fact not
all those countries are actually that unequal (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, to mention
a few, do not present very high Gini coe¢ cients of their own). Alternatively, some would
argue that new democratic coalitions coming into power, even when from the left, will try
to disguise themselves and avoid engaging in leftist redistribution (Acemoglu, Egorov and
Sonin (2010)), which might be a mitigating factor of the e⁄ect of inequality on government.
20III. Concluding Observations
In this paper we have investigated the hypotheses that governments tend to increase in
size during periods of democratisation, and also that democracies, and the electorate, mature
over time. The evidence, based on a sample of Latin American countries that have recently
democratised in the last forty years or so, and on panel data analysis, is suggestive of the fact
that young democracies indeed engage in larger spending, debt and consequently end up with
a larger share of the GDP. Furthermore, the evidence points to the fact that democracies
become more responsible, and perhaps more conservative, in terms of consumption, debt
and overall government size as time passes by, or that there is a learning process within
democracies.
The importance of this study is that we have been able to speci￿cally study the Latin
American case, with all its idiosyncrasies, without having to treat the region either as a
dummy or as an outlier to be removed from the sample. With that we have obviously
furthered our understanding of the recent history of the region in terms of government size
and dynamics during political transitions, which might be of some use to understand the
new wave of democratisation a⁄ecting the world as we speak.
Future research can be extended to even further disaggregations and comparisons. For
instance, the Brazilian case is of some interest and quite illustrative in the sense that it has
democratised in the 1980s and then su⁄ered severe bursts of macroeconomic instability for
ten years or so (the so-called lost decade). On the other hand, South Africa which is a young
democracy being governed by a very broad political coalition has so far not displayed any
sign of ballooning debt nor macroeconomic instability.
Perhaps the lesson from above is that ideally young democracies inherit, or implement
right away, an institutional framework which includes particular economic institutions such as
central bank independence and ￿scal responsibility laws, institutions that help to constraint
the executive and which were absent in Brazil in 1985, but already present in South Africa in
1995. All in all, it seems that democracy matures with time as well as the democratisation
21processes themselves.
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1Although there are signs that inequality is decreasing in some places, see Bittencourt
(2011) for a recent analysis of the Brazilian case.
2The same sort of pattern arises when we graph the OLS regression lines between other
variables for government and the dummies. Available on request.
3We also have some evidence which suggests that governments increase in size during the
￿rst democratic term, however the evidence is somehow weaker. This is probably because
young democracies are still living under a budget which was decided by the last dictatorship
in power. Available on request.
25